The puzzle that this chapter seeks to address can be stated quite succinctly: if we accept that the United States possesses a preponderant (and, for some, unprecedented) degree of structural power in both the global and the regional political economies, and by extension in the arena of trade, why does it prove consistently to be unable to secure outcomes consistent with its interests and preferences? This puzzle reveals itself across the arenas of the contemporary global and regional engagement of the United States: the profound difficulty with which the United States is able to exercise the raw material and institutional power capabilities it possesses is evident in its negotiations in multilateral and international organizations, its military strategies and attempts to maintain political and social order, the war on drugs in the Americas, recent strategies to address the political inconveniences posed by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, and an array of other instances associated with strategies relating to energy, China, the construction of global or regional coalitions around various issue areas, and so on. The question acquires considerable pertinence when thinking about the evolution of both multilateral and regional trade, the latter in a context in which most observers and participants have given the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project up for dead, and the United States, over the course of more than a decade, was unable effectively to wield either its coercive power or the "soft" power of consensual hegemony to entrench the particular form of commercial and economic governance it envisaged as the foundation for the regional trade project. Given that this is the region of the world that remains most characterized by economic and commercial dependence on the United States (and the levels of vulnerability implied by that level of dependence), and that this is the region in which the United States is usually deemed to possess the greatest overall degree of hegemonic power, this puzzle becomes all the more compelling.
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The puzzle is not entirely a new one and not peculiar to the contemporary period.
Rather, it is a question that consistently preoccupied scholars in relation to the postwar period, and was formulated primarily as a concern with the domestic constraints on the "external" power of the United States, particularly in the context of a scholarly conjuncture in which the relationship between the domestic and international determinants of foreign policy was at its height in the field of International Relations (Krasner, 1977; Ikenberry, Lake and Mastanduno, 1988) . One could also address the puzzle as a matter of policy failure, and set out all manner of explanations for each instance of failure on the part of the United States in achieving stated objectives, whether these focus on strategic miscalculations, policy mismanagement, unforeseen circumstances, political opposition, legal or normative constraints, or whatever. But I contend that there is something more "structural" at stake here, which takes us beyond a focus on isolated instances of policy failure and does not give the extent of theoretical precedence found in many earlier analyses to the constraints imposed by domestic politics and institutions, even while the latter form a crucial part of the explanation for the nature and persistence of the puzzle itself and are central to the arguments that will be developed here. Rather, I see this puzzle in terms of an intrinsic disjuncture between the structural dimensions of U.S. power and what we might call its "agential" dimensions, which issues both theoretical and empirical challenges to dominant understandings of U.S. power in the contemporary period.
The premise from which this chapter starts is that the existence of structural primacy (or hegemony), which reaches across the terrains of "structural power" identified usefully by Susan Strange (1987) , is frequently not accompanied by an ability to exercise preponderant control over outcomes and unilateral dominance over the processes in which the United States is engaged. It is important to be clear from the outset that the power of the United States, whether understood as hegemony, primacy or domination, has never and will never approximate "absolute" power, and indeed that these concepts do not imply as much. To argue that there are limits to U.S.
power and to posit a disjuncture between the structural and agential dimensions of power as a way of understanding does not suggest that the United States does not possess preponderant power of an historically unprecedented nature. Nor does it imply that we are measuring U.S. power against some preposterous benchmark which precludes any possibility of policy failure or constraint on the nature, extent or articulation of U.S. power. Rather, the argument here is that there exist a range of intrinsic limits to U.S. power which are sufficiently ingrained in the structures of U.S.
power that we can make a strong argument, as others have done in relation to other periods, concerning the discrepancy between, in Stephen Krasner's (1977) terms, the potential and actual power of the United States or, in my own terms, the structural and agential power of the United States in the contemporary global and regional political economies. We thus need both to expose this disjuncture and to explain why it should arise in such pronounced form across the various arenas of the global and regional engagement of the United States.
It should be highlighted that the disjuncture in question is explicitly recognized "on the ground" by trade policy makers in the United States and that it permeates the design of contemporary trade strategies. It translates into a self-conscious concern with the achievement of what is usually termed "leverage."
2 This idea of leverage arises from a core perception that what has been eroded over the last several decades is precisely the degree of leverage which ensures the effective pursuit of U.S. interests and policy objectives-that is, the ability of the United States to exercise the power associated with its position of global and regional primacy in trade negotiations across the spectrum. The core argument advanced in this paper, then, is that the evolution of U.S. trade strategies, both globally and regionally, reflects attempts on the part of policy makers to mitigate and compensate the limitations of U.S. agential power. This explains clearly the shift toward bilateralism as the primary focus of trade policy, in the pursuit of the "leverage" which would facilitate the entrenchment of a global and regional commercial and economic order in line with U.S. interests and preferences.
In other words, the invigoration of bilateralism in regional trade strategies is, firstly, a response to the growing challenge to U.S. power in the Americas, particularly in ideological terms and in respect of the economic and trade agenda it has elaborated and pursued. Secondly, it is a clear reflection of the limits of U.S. power in those instances in which attempts to mobilize either the attributes of structural power or agential power have failed-in this case, most clearly, in the FTAA project, but also in the difficulties surrounding the spate of bilateral agreements that have recently been submitted for congressional approval in the United States and across the region.
Our task, then, is to develop this argument by attending to the reasons for the structural/agential disjuncture in U.S. power, the sources from which it arises and the implications it carries for our understandings of the politics of trade in the Americas.
Before doing so, the following section offers a brief account of the evolution of U.S.
trade policy. (Luck, 1999) . While the United States has exercised structural dominance within the institutions of the world trading system, as in the international financial organisations, nevertheless its record of compliance with multilateral trade rules and procedures has been an increasingly unhappy one, particularly since the 1980s as the dynamism and effectiveness of multilateral trade negotiations have also declined more markedly (Bergsten, 2002: 86-98; Tussie, 1998: 183-193) . At the same time, its political dominance of the process has been complicated by increasingly fractious relations with both the EU and developing countries. The result of these trends has been a much greater inclination on the part of successive U.S. governments to explore alternative avenues and arenas for advancing global trade liberalization.
The turn to regionalism in the late 1980s and early 1990s must, in this sense, be understood as arising from a growing disaffection in the United States with the progress of multilateral negotiations and, moreover, the growing political problems encountered in realizing the particular vision of a multilateral trading order that animated U.S. engagement in it. It was also a product of two other preoccupations.
The first was that associated with perceptions within the United States of a steady erosion of its global hegemony. The "declinist" debates became prevalent from the 1970s onwards, and were epitomized by anxious concern about the apparently superior growth performances of Japanese and German models of capitalism and the steady march of integration in the EU. Regionalism became incorporated into the global hegemonic strategies of the United States largely as an attempt to counter these perceived threats to its economic dominance emerging from other regions and other powerful economies.
The second and related preoccupation was one which achieved particular salience toward the end of the 1990s, and is still deployed frequently in speeches by trade liberalization" was elevated to the status of policy "credo" by the USTR (Zoellick, 2003b) , facilitated by the granting of "fast-track" negotiating authority under the Trade Act of 2002 (which had been denied to the Clinton administration since 1998).
The credo of "competition in liberalization" connoted an advance toward the negotiation of trade agreements on "multiple fronts"-multilateral, regional and bilateral-designed to place the United States "at the center of a network of initiatives" (Zoellick, 2001) . The rationale was that such a strategy "provides leverage for openness in all negotiations, establishes models of success that can be used on many fronts, and develops a fresh political dynamic that puts free trade on the offensive" (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2004) . The element of "competition" relates to the attempt to create a series of precedents with which, in each successive trade agreement, the baseline requirements for subsequent agreements are ratcheted up, along with the incentives for trading partners to negotiate with the United States distinctively on its terms.
The trade policy credo, in other words, accelerates the momentum of global liberalization by increasing the incentives for countries to negotiate bilateral trade agreements with the United States, designed sequentially to raise the bar for subsequent negotiations (see VanGrasstek, 2000) . Given that the selection of countries for these negotiations is primarily reactive in nature-it is the country (or group of countries) aspiring to a trade agreement with the United States which is required, in the first instance, to make its case for consideration (Phillips, 2007b; Feinberg, 2003) -the expectation among U.S. trade policy makers is that a competition among countries will consequently emerge to provide the most attractive set of incentives for the initiation of negotiations. By extension, as the dynamism in world trade shifts to bilateral negotiations, it is a distinctively U.S. trade agenda which is thereby facilitated as the foundation for this new playing field.
The manner in which this strategy has evolved and been deployed has been conditioned by key shifts in multilateral and regional trade politics. Most notable among these have been the gradual implosion of World Trade Organization (WTO)
negotiations and the disintegration of the FTAA project in late 2003. As a result of the overriding concern with how then to establish and exercise "leverage" in its trade and economic relationships, the USTR has afforded even greater priority to bilateral negotiations. With rhetoric reminiscent of that surrounding the invasion of Iraqleading one observer pithily to cast Zoellick as a "Donald Rumsfeld of trade policy" (Bhagwati, 2004: 52) -the strategy has been to construct a "coalition of the liberalizers": to pursue bilateral agreements with "willing" countries, concomitantly to exclude and isolate the "unwilling," and thereby to exert sustained pressure on "recalcitrant" countries such as Brazil. Thus, in the FTAA context, Zoellick declared in 2002 that "we want to negotiate with all the democracies of the Americas through the FTAA, but we are also prepared to move step-by-step toward free trade if others turn back or simply are not ready" (Zoellick, 2002 The cumulative result has been a rash of bilateral negotiations and agreements with partners around the world, a number of which were signed soon after fast-track authority was granted and a greater number of which were set in train following the 
To recap, then: bilateralism has been pursued by the United States, in the Americas and elsewhere, as a mechanism of increasing the leverage which it has progressively lacked in both multilateral (WTO) and regional (FTAA) trade negotiations. In the terms set out at the start of the chapter, the turn to bilateralism has been a reflection of an increasingly pronounced disjuncture between the structural power that the United
States possesses in the arena of trade-stemming from its structural position of dominance in the global and regional economy, as well as its dominance in the key institutions of multilateral trade-and its ability to achieve outcomes consistent with its stated objectives and interests. However, this disjuncture has also been evident in the United States' bilateral trade relationships. The passage of the CAFTA-DR through the U.S. Congress was intensely fraught and considerably more difficult and acrimonious than even the USTR had envisaged, 4 even though it was eventually ratified by the narrowest of margins (217 votes Explaining the Structural/Agential Disjuncture in U.S.
Regional Trade Relations
How then do we explain the disjuncture between the dominance of the United States in the regional economy and its trade structures, on the one hand, and on the other its ability effectively to achieve outcomes in trade policy consistent with its stated objectives and interests? I wish to explore three dimensions of a possible explanation in this chapter, all of which revolve around the central issue of the way in which U.S.
power is intrinsically constituted and shaped by global, regional and domestic politics.
The first is the nature of the U.S. state and the range of bureaucratic issues that impinge upon the formulation and execution of trade strategies; the second is the nature of domestic (U.S.) politics surrounding the trade process; the third is the nature of regional politics and regional structures in the Americas, revolving around the political economy of neoliberalism and contestation of the trade agenda pursued by the United States.
The Trade Policymaking Process
It has long been recognized that the particular nature of the U.S. state and political system impinges in crucial ways not only on the overall hegemony of the United
States but also on the effectiveness of various policy arenas within the hegemonic project. Analyses have drawn attention to a range of characteristics of the U.S. state, ranging from constitutional provisions to coalition building by dominant political parties, the particular form of separation of powers, the presidential (as opposed to parliamentary) system and so on (see Strange, 1987) . The most salient preoccupation, inevitably, has been with the ways in which all these characteristics of the U.S.
political system add up to a state which is highly permeable to powerful lobbies and interest groups; consequently, much analysis, particularly in U.S. scholarship, has been imbued with a excessively narrow and determinist focus on interest group politics. Equally, there is a long-standing debate, with which space here precludes a lengthy engagement, centring on explanations for the differences in policy making processes across policy areas, particularly between trade policy and international monetary policy, and indeed in different issue areas within those policy areas. Here again, the emphasis has routinely been on contending understandings of the relationship between state and society, and specifically questions of either state autonomy in relation to societal interests or collective action within particular issue areas (Katzenstein, 1978; Krasner, 1978; Zysman, 1983; Goldstein, 1986; Gowa, 1988) . Put together, all these characteristics can be taken to constitute a form of "political entropy" (Cerny, 1989) , which acts to the detriment of both consistency and predictability.
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We will return to these issues of interest group activity shortly, along with the question of executive-congressional relations. For now, our concern is with the state and bureaucratic structures that shape particular policy areas. In trade policy making, indeed, the degree of bureaucratic and institutional fragmentation are particularly pronounced, in ways which are clearly pivotal to an understanding of the policy inconsistencies that one perceives in this policy area-policy inconsistencies that revolve around the central and long-standing tension between liberal and protectionist impulses which have manifested themselves across the gamut of U.S. trade strategies and, in particular, permeated congressional activity and public opinion surrounding trade policy. Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Council, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Office of Management and Budget. 6 The most defining interactions lie between the first four of these agencies and represent essentially the differences (and tensions) between their guiding concerns. As is well known, the Department of State's role in the trade policy process revolves around ensuring that policy is consistent with and contributes to overarching foreign policy, security and diplomatic goals; Commerce concerns itself with the interests of specific industries;
Treasury with macroeconomic issues; and so on. to change without a significant rupture in the nature of the U.S. political system (Gowa, 1988; Goldstein, 1986 ). Yet, beyond this, U.S. trade strategies are defined fundamentally by what Richard Feinberg has appositely termed "ad hoc reactivism."
In the current debate about the selection of trade partners for bilateral negotiations, the USTR and others have preferred the adjectives "flexible" or "not mechanical" to "ad ho," but the point remains that trade negotiations have been initiated "generally in response to an insistent external request, not as the considered unfolding of a carefully designed internally-generated strategic plan" (Feinberg, 2003 (Feinberg, : 1022 . In addition, trade policy is an area which is especially vulnerable to shifts in the influence of agencies such as the State Department, as officials seek to put trade policy to the service of what may be abruptly changing foreign policy priorities. It is also more vulnerable than most policy areas to shifting patterns of congressional and public opinion, as will be discussed shortly. This is not to suggest that trade policy is intrinsically hostage to foreign and security policy priorities, nor indeed to subscribe to those parts of the debate that see trade policy as a blank canvas for interest group politics. Rather, it is to suggest that the elaboration of an internally generated strategic plan, to which Feinberg alludes, has been significantly complicated by the weight of multiple, and often competing, pressures that are brought to bear on trade policy through the functioning of the interagency process and the sprawling, fragmented nature of the trade policy architecture in Washington, DC.
In more general terms, the political and bureaucratic system governing trade policy trade negotiators, and is reinforced by particular pressures from Commerce and elsewhere, from the outset the negotiating terrain is structurally skewed toward not only U.S. interests in general but also those of specific sectors and industries (Phillips, 2005) .
It is this framework, reflecting the intrinsic tension between overarching ideas in U.S. trade policy, which has generated many of the intractable tensions in trade negotiations, particularly in the FTAA process. The exclusion from these negotiations of both agriculture and trade remedies was seen by many governments and interests across the rest of the region to stand in direct contradiction with the United States' insistence on both a "WTO-plus" format and a "single undertaking" as the conditions of a hemispheric free trade agreement. The line, in essence, was that WTO-plus should prevail across the board, including in agriculture and trade remedies, and that anything short of this agreement was not acceptable to a large group of countries led by Brazil, comprising primarily member states of the Southern Common Market 
The Domestic Politics of Trade in the United States
The historic ambivalence to free trade in U.S. public and political opinion, and the fraught politics that habitually surround free trade agreements, have been amply in evidence since the start of the 1990s. Much (but not all) of this sensitivity is related to the pronounced concern about the impact of trade on the U.S. labor market. The fact that early agreements such as those with Chile, Singapore, Morocco or Australia passed through Congress with relative ease is because they represented little threat to labor and key sectors in the U.S.
economy. Under the first Bush administration, indeed, early trade strategies prioritized negotiations that could be concluded and ratified relatively quickly, and this was facilitated by the fact that none of the countries concerned represented excessive threats to U.S. labor and/or the most politically sensitive parts of the U.S.
economy. It must also be stressed again, however, that in each of these deals "sensitive" sectors and products were excluded from negotiation or identified as exemptions in the texts of agreements. Those agreements deemed to represent a considerably greater threat to the U.S. labor market-notably CAFTA-DR-have been subject to the same partisan and public battles as those which surrounded similarly contentious agreements in the past, such as the NAFTA.
Indeed, as noted a second ago, one frequently hears explanations of the difficulties surrounding ratification of CAFTA-DR that center on the parallels that are drawn with NAFTA. In the latter case, the political "leverage" that was mobilized for the purposes of securing its passage related to the implications that free trade would carry for dealing with many of the developmental problems that gave rise to labor migration 
The Regional Politics of Trade in the Americas
Finally, then, what can we say of the regional politics of trade which shape, define and, indeed, limit the agential power of the United States in this arena? The first and most obvious point to make is that the political economy of the Americas can no longer be understood, if it ever could be, in the simple terms of a north-south structure of economic and political dependence, on the one hand, or, on the other, the clear-cut and indisputable dominance of the United States. In general terms, the structural power that the United States possesses in the region could be said to have remained intact, but the methods by which it is exercised shifted away from the coercive, interventionist foreign policies of the cold war period toward an approach based on 188 the building of ideological "consensus" around the transitions to democracy and market economics, and on the elaboration of regionalist projects.
One interpretation of these trends sees their result to be a "relational delinking"
between the United States and Latin America, in which relations have come to be characterized by the increasing political and economic independence of Latin America from the United States, on the one hand, and on the other the diminishing political and diplomatic interest of the United States in the Latin American region (Muñoz, 2001: 73-90) . However, the same cannot be said for the majority of the countries of the region, which have continued to be characterized by a pronounced dependence on the United
States. Indeed, as global competition has intensified under the impact of globalization, as well as multilateral and unilateral processes of liberalization, many countries in the Americas have found competitive participation in global markets to be more, rather than less, remote as a strategic option. Furthermore, the emergence of China in the global economy has been pivotal in reinforcing and sharpening the profound obstacles to competitiveness in Latin American economies, including in the U.S. market (Phillips, 2007a; Dussel Peters, this volume; Jenkins et al., 2006) . Notably too, this new political economy of dependence features not only of dependence on the U.S. market as a destination for exports and a source of investment, but also dependence on the U.S. economy as a source of jobs for hundreds of thousands of people who migrate each year to the United States from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
It is to be expected, then, that yawning differences across the region in terms of levels of dependence on the United States and associated issues of political and economic "weight" should yield considerable variation in the nature of participation in trade and trade politics. Yet, even in cases in which dependence is pronounced, there have been clear limits to the extent to which the United States has been able to 188 dominate the trade agenda-that is, there has been a clear disjuncture between the structural power that arises from its position of primacy and the nature of regional dependence on the U.S. economy, on the one hand, and, on the other, the ability of U.S. governments to secure outcomes consistent with stated preferences. In part this disjuncture stems from a changing regional politics, in which coalitions of countries have been able to mount challenges to the particular strategies pursued by the United
States. In other part, it arises as a result of profound regional-and domestic-level rejections in various contexts of both U.S. power and the particular trade agenda through which the United States has sought to entrench its hegemony in the region.
The first of these-a changing regional politics-was manifest in the FTAA Social protest has accompanied the negotiations also in this subregion, the protagonists here including Ecuadorean indigenous groups and Peruvian farmers'
groups.
The central issue in these regional politics of trade is thus linked directly with broader questions about the structural/agential disjuncture in U.S. power, and concerns the declining legitimacy of both U.S. power and the particular trade and economic agenda it has pursued, both regionally and globally. In this respect neoGramscian conceptions of hegemony become rather useful, centering as they do on the question of legitimate and consensual power: hegemony constitutes a condition in which the governed accept or acquiesce in authority without the need for the application of force. Hegemony, as Robert Cox puts it, "meant leadership rather than domination" (Cox, 2004: 311) . Consent is therefore crucial to the exercise of power, not in the sense that there needs to be active consent before power can be exercised (the United States can and does act unilaterally and coercively), but rather that the increasing difficulty in the exercise of agential power is linked, I suggest, to the erosion of the legitimacy of U.S. power.
In the arena of trade in the Americas, this erosion of legitimacy has been particularly marked, and has taken three principal forms. The first is as a rejection of neoliberalism and, in particular, the Washington Consensus as a template for political The third form that the erosion of legitimacy has taken, which needs only brief mention, is that of a cruder variety of anti-Americanism, the trade agenda providing a useful focal point but not necessarily the crux of the political issue at stake.
In this way, it is the broad erosion of the legitimacy of U.S. hegemony, as it is expressed through both the neoliberal project and particular economic and trade strategies, that forms the foundation of the regional politics which have acted to limit the agential power of the United States in the Americas. Notwithstanding continuing forms of dependence on the United States, increasingly strident ideological and political challenges in Latin America and the Caribbean have permeated the politics of both hemispheric and bilateral trade, to the extent that the United States has been quite strikingly constrained in its ability to secure its preferred outcomes in trade negotiations.
Conclusions
Mainstream debates about U.S. power understand it essentially as an "input" in world and regional politics. Hegemony, in the bulk of IR and IPE debates, is taken largely as a given, whether referring to structural or relational power, and the only task is apparently to measure it and establish whether it is declining in either absolute or relative terms. What I have tried to suggest here is that we need to focus not on the amount of U.S. power and not on hegemony as an "input" or "public good" in the global political economy, but rather on the ways in which the nature of U.S. power is forged by politics and political interactions, at the domestic (U.S.), regional and global levels (although the latter has not been the focus here). In other words, the appropriate debate about U.S. power (or hegemony) is not a debate about resources or attributes, but rather a debate about politics and the way that hegemony is constituted and shaped both domestically and regionally or globally. This point about politics is not trivial-in fact, it suggests a very different approach to understanding power and hegemony from the one which currently prevails, which not only focuses on hegemony as an attribute of a given state and as an input in world or regional politics, but is also characterized by a curious "apoliticism." Part of the problem here is that U.S. hegemony is habitually analyzed in a manner consistent with wider trends in U.S. social sciences, which Anatol Lieven has identified as "increasing isolationism, determinism and dogmatism" associated with dominance of rational choice models (Lieven, 2004: 66) . U.S. hegemony is conceived essentially in isolation from the rest of the world (the notion of hegemony as an "input" in world politics) and as existing curiously independently of any form of constitution by domestic political economy.
Furthermore, when, in a theoretical sense, politics have been injected more centrally into analysis, the tendency has been again to conceptualize politics distinctively as domestic politics, as in the work, mentioned earlier of Krasner, Goldstein, Gowa, Katzenstein, and others. The notion of U.S. power as an input into world politics thus remains essentially intact-U.S. power is shaped and constituted by domestic politics and then projected outwards.
This emphasis on the political constitution of power in the domestic, regional and global contexts is central to explanation of the structural/agential disjuncture, both in general and in trade politics. Linking to the core issue of the legitimacy of U.S. power and fracturing of "consensus" or "soft power" in the trade arena, the argument here has been that it is the nature of both domestic politics and an emerging regional politics of trade that have complicated the effective, agential, mobilization of the structural power that the United States possesses in the regional political economy and in the arena of trade more specifically. Furthermore, consistent with this line of argument, bilateralism may be seen as a response to the consequent limitations of U.S.
